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Many social relationships are a locus of struggle and suffering, either at the individual or
interactional level. In this paper we explore why this is the case and suggest a modeling
approach for dyadic interactions and the well-being of the participants.To this end we bring
together an enactive approach to selfwith dynamical systems theory. Our basic assumption
is that the quality of any social interaction or relationship fundamentally depends on the
nature and constitution of the individuals engaged in these interactions. From an enactive
perspective the self is conceived as an embodied and socially enacted autonomous system
striving to maintain an identity. This striving involves a basic two-fold goal: the ability to
exist as an individual in one’s own right, while also being open to and affected by others.
In terms of dynamical systems theory one can thus consider the individual self as a self-
other organized system represented by a phase space spanned by the dimensions of
distinction and participation, where attractors can be deﬁned. Based on two everyday
examples of dyadic relationship we propose a simple model of relationship dynamics, in
which struggle or well-being in the dyad is analyzed in terms of movements of dyadic states
that are in tension or in harmony with individually developed attractors. Our model predicts
that relationships can be sustained when the dyad develops a new joint attractor toward
which dyadic states tend to move, and well-being when this attractor is in balance with
the individuals’ attractors.We outline how this can inspire research on psychotherapy. The
psychotherapy process itself provides a setting that supports clients to become aware how
they fare with regards to the two-fold norm of distinction and participation and develop,
through active engagement between client (or couple) and therapist, strategies to co-
negotiate their self-organization.
Keywords: enactive self, distinction and participation, dynamical systems theory, well-being in relationships, the
self as attractor, relationship dynamics, couples counseling
INTRODUCTION
Many social relationships are a locus of struggle and suffering,
either at the individual or interactional level. Dyadic exchange and
the question of well-being in relationships constitute the core of
the psychotherapeutic process, as well as the content of most nar-
ratives processed in everyday life. Our goal is to better understand
why some couples manage to sustain their interactions whereas
others terminate their relationships. We also wish to generate ideas
for improving the quality of dyadic interactions and the psycho-
logical well-being of the participants. To this end we conjoin a
dynamical systems theory perspective with an enactive approach
to self and explore the dynamics underlying struggle in couples’
relationships.
Dynamical systems theory (DST) is a branch of mathe-
matics, and as such neither part of the natural sciences nor
of the humanities (Salvatore and Tschacher, 2012). Its con-
cepts, heuristics and methods can be used to interrelate theories
and ﬁndings of the various disciplines and to facilitate the
dialogue between them. DST describes the complex behavior
of systems over time. It allows us to interrelate experien-
tial ﬁndings associated with relationship struggle and to derive
implications for improving dyadic interaction and enabling rela-
tionships.
However, before assessing problems at the level of the inter-
action we should clarify our understanding of the individuals
involved in it. We need to reconsider their basic nature as indi-
viduals and what drives their behavior. We suggest characterizing
the individuals in the dyad from an enactive perspective, according
to which every individual self is genuinely social and purposeful.
The enactive self is social because it exists through engagements
with others, and it is purposeful because it thereby strives to sur-
vive as a social existence. The self follows a primordial two-fold
existential norm: being distinct from, as well as connected to, oth-
ers. We propose that such a basic normative structure of self exists
in all individuals. It guides their behavior and how they evaluate
and negotiate their relationships.
Our strategy is as follows. We begin with a brief summary
of the enactive self in Section “Distinction and Participation:
An Enactive Approach to Self.” Based on this, as an inter-
mediate step, we conceptualize in Section “Socially Enacted
Autonomy from a Dynamical Systems Theory Perspective” the
enactive self in terms of dynamical systems theory as a non-linear
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dynamical system. In Section “Dyadic Relationship as Negotia-
tion of Individual and Dyadic Attractor Regions” we introduce
two everyday examples of couple relationships using our con-
cepts to describe the dynamics underlying the struggle in these
interactions, and to arrive at two simple models of relation-
ship maintenance. In Section “Discussion” we compare the two
examples and derive two styles of individual relationship engage-
ment, the passive-closed and active-open style, hypothesizing that
the latter is more apt to sustain a relationship and to improve
well-being in a dyadic relationship. In the last part we out-
line how the ﬁndings in this paper may inspire research in
psychotherapy.
DISTINCTION AND PARTICIPATION: AN ENACTIVE
APPROACH TO SELF
In this section we provide a short summary of the enactive
approach to self as a social autonomous system (Kyselo, sub-
mitted), a recent development in enactivism. Enactivism is a
non-reductionist and integrative epistemological framework for
cognitive science that adopts a process-based and biologically
grounded perspective on cognition (Varela et al., 1993; Jonas,
1966; Varela, 1997; Weber and Varela, 2002; Thompson, 2007).
It is rooted in the theory of autopoiesis and the idea that living
beings can be minimally characterized as self-producing and self-
organizing networks of biological processes that create a systemic
identity (Maturana and Varela, 1980, 1987). Enactivism assumes
that biological and mental phenomena are continuous and that
therefore the identity of cognitive beings can be conceived as
based on similar principles and concepts (Clark, 2001; Thomp-
son and Varela, 2001; Di Paolo et al., 2010). It is thus inspired by
the autopoietic idea of self-generated identity, but elaborates on
this concept by suggesting the more general notion of autonomy
to capture not only biological but also cognitive individuation (Di
Paolo, 2005; Thompson, 2007; Barandiaran et al., 2009; Di Paolo
et al., 2010). In the enactive view on autonomy there is no clear-cut
separation between individual system and environment. Cognitive
individuals emerge from active engagement with the environment
through which they self-produce an identity. They thereby follow
an intrinsic purpose, namely to survive and to maintain their self-
generated identity (Weber and Varela, 2002). This implies a basic
tension in the individual: a need to emancipate oneself from the
environment as an individual, while at the same time having a
structural dependence on it for material resources (Jonas, 1966).
Through being self-organized in this way, individuals always
have their own basic perspective on the world, i.e., they eval-
uate their interactions with the world according to what these
interactions mean with regards to the goal of generating and
maintaining an identity. The enactivists call this sense-making,
the value-driven active engagement with the environment that in
turn creates meaning for the system itself (Weber andVarela, 2002;
Thompson and Stapleton, 2009).
The enactive view on cognitive individuation has been recently
elaborated to inspire a new look at the human self (Kyselo, sub-
mitted). According to this, the self is essentially a phenomenon of
life and a question about the nature of human cognitive individu-
ation. Usually the processes of cognitive individuation have been
characterized in terms of embodiment (Kyselo and Di Paolo, 2013;
Di Paolo and Thompson, forthcoming), but according to the enac-
tive perspective on the human self the body is not the sole source
of individuation. The world of humans is a world of others, so
our social relations are what matter most to us. Much in line with
theories of self that emphasize the social, processual or dialogi-
cal nature of self (Mead, 1934; Buber, 1947/2002; Vygotsky, 1986;
Hermans et al., 1992; Tschacher and Rössler, 1996; Mahler et al.,
2000) the enactive approach thus assumes that the social must play
a vital role in any description of human cognitive individuation.
The enactive self is operationally deﬁned as a socially enacted
autonomous system, whose systemic network identity emerges
as a result of an ongoing engagement in social interaction pro-
cesses that can be qualiﬁed as moving in two opposed directions,
distinction and participation (Kyselo, submitted). On this account,
the self as identity is continuously co-generated through inter-
acting and being related to others and at the time organizes
interactions and relations. The individual self is therefore never
fully separable from the social environment. It is determined pre-
cisely in terms of the types of social interactions and relations of
which it is also a part. Yet in order to exist as an identiﬁable unity,
the self also involves an ongoing process of emancipation from
others. This basic tension between dependence and emancipation
is primordial to the nature of human individuation, and for this
reason, it is considered a fundamental drive for human behavior.
Whereas living systems strive to survive by avoiding interactions
with the environment that threaten their biological survival, the
purpose of the human self is additionally to ensure its identity
and survive as social existence1. In line with the enactive perspec-
tive on autonomy, every individual self thus has its own subjective
perspective on the world, a perspective from which social interac-
tions and relations are evaluated according to whether and how
they serve the survival, i.e., maintenance, of the self. This mainte-
nance follows a two-fold basic norm thatmirrors the tension of the
social individual to emancipate itself from the social environment
while at the same time structurally relying on it: being able to exist
as individual in one’s own right (distinction) while at the same
time remaining connected with others (participation). Distinction
means that the person experiences herself as both emancipated
and yet not fully independent of the social world. Participation
means that she feels both connected and open to, but also not
fully immersed in, the social world. Both dimensions can overlap.
Distinction does not imply that the person does not interact or
has to be alone (think of the familiar experience of feeling alone
despite being surrounded by others). Participation, on the other
hand, does not imply that the person must interact all the time. A
person can feel very open or related to another person even when
not actually engaged with her. Both distinction and participation
are (experienced) types of social interactions and relations, yet
1This is not to say that the body does not matter but that individuation does not
emerge through bodily processes in isolation. The body changes its status becoming
a mediator of the self as socially enacted existence. The bodily sense of self can be
biologically grounded but its meaning for the self as individual being can only be
derived in dependence on how the self is in the world that is, based on and in relation
to others. It must be seen as a matrix telling us (e.g., through emotions) how we
fare in these interactions with regards to the minimal purpose of human existence:
to be someone who is at the same time a person in her own right while also being a
person that one can connect to. Bodily experiences thus acquire a social meaning.
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they may say little about the amount or actuality of engagement.
In every individual the amount and distribution of distinction and
participation can come in different degrees: some individuals have
a generally strong sense of being an individual in their own right,
but feel not so open to others, while others feel equally open to
others.
Throughout an individual’s life there are phases when one may
feel or strive formore or less distinction or participation; as a child,
for instance, there might be a stronger openness to being affected
by others and a lower experience of being separated, whereas dur-
ing adolescence feelings of being or wanting to be separated are
more dominant. Distinction or participation furthermore depend
on a given cultural context, and on whether a greater value of
one or the other is developed because it is socially more accepted
(Markus and Kitayama, 2010). Furthermore, even though at times
one of the dimensions may become extremely dominant and the
other appears out of reach, the other dimension can or will, at
some point or implicitly, drive the individual’s behavior. Thus, for
example, feeling very distinct at some point does not mean that
there is no striving for connection and openness anymore.
An excessive degree of distinction would mean that the indi-
vidual has no sense of openness or connection to others, while
excessive participation would mean that the individual is com-
pletely immersed in the interaction. Humans thus strive to avoid
the double risk of emancipation at the cost of being isolated and
of connection at the cost of dissolution of the individual self. We
can ﬁnd examples that approximate such extreme cases in dis-
orders of the self such as schizophrenia (Parnas and Sass, 2010)
and symptoms like social or self-isolation (no participation) or
loss of agency (no distinction). But even though these cases are
exceptional, the suffering that accompanies these extreme states
could actually be indicative of a persisting striving to balance both
dimensions.
Importantly, the maintenance of the self according to the two-
fold normative structure of distinction and participation requires
constant negotiation with others, that is, engaging with, and dis-
engaging from them. The self is thus co-generated with others and
since interactions with others can go wrong and fail to contribute
to identity maintenance in the desired way, the self is genuinely
vulnerable.
In the next sectionwe conceptualize this view on self in terms of
dynamical systems theory and then derive a model of interaction
dynamics between two selves.
SOCIALLY ENACTED AUTONOMY FROM A DYNAMICAL
SYSTEMS THEORY PERSPECTIVE
Dynamical systems theory (DST) allows describing a system at two
levels: by variables that denote state changes of systems over time,
and by parameters that constrain these changes (gradients). DST
has been used in cognitive science to replace the input/output
model of cognition, and propose a context- and time-sensitive
account of cognition (Thelen and Smith, 1994; Van Gelder, 1998;
Tschacher andDauwalder, 1999) and neural dynamics (Haken and
Tschacher, 2010). More recently, researchers in enactive cognitive
science have appealed to DST to describe mind, social interaction,
and sensorimotor skill-use (Thompson, 2007; De Jaegher and Di
Paolo, 2007; Froese and Di Paolo, 2010; Buhrmann et al., 2013). In
this section we use DST to conceptualize the self as socially enacted
autonomy.
We begin with a brief reminder of some of the main concepts
of DST. A core notion especially relevant for our purposes is the
concept of attractor, which can be formally deﬁned in terms of the
phase space of a system. The phase space is a geometrical spacewith
one or more dimensions, depending on the number of variables
needed to fully describe the system (Abraham and Shaw, 1992).
This can be exempliﬁed by Euclidean space: Euclidean phase space
has three spatial dimensions, i.e., the coordinate axes x, y, and
z. Any state of an object situated in Euclidean phase space can
simply be described by the three spatial coordinates. DST captures
not only a particular state of the system, but also how the system
changes in time.
Imagine a golf ball being hit, ﬂying through space, landing
on grass, rolling and ending up in a well or the hole of a golf
course. The golf ball represents a simple dynamical system. While
ﬂying through the air, rolling on the grass, etc., the ball follows
a speciﬁc trajectory (its ﬂight or path) through Euclidean space
(the three dimensions of space). Until it ends up at the bottom of
a hole, the ball trajects the three dimensions of space (x, y, and
z), changing its states over time. The state of the ball in the hole,
after it has come to a rest, can be represented as a particular single
point in phase space, to which the three dimensions of the system’s
trajectory through space have converged. Assuming that the ball
will always end up in the hole after many different trajectories,
we would arrive at a simple illustration of a dynamics in which
the system’s three dimensions are always compressed toward zero
dimensions, which is indicative of so-called attractor dynamics.
The unchanging, stable state, such as in the bottom of the hole in
golf, is referred to as a point attractor.
As the example of the golf ball illustrates, DST concepts allow
visualizing complex temporal behaviors of particular systems in
terms of geometrical representations. We use the notions of phase
space, trajectory and attractor to conceptualize the states and
changes of a human self.
From a DST perspective the human self can be seen as a
non-linear dynamical system that displays a particular behavior
represented as movement through the “landscape” of phase space
(Nowak et al., 2002; Tschacher and Munt, 2013). The phase space
of the enactive self refers to the states of the self as created in its rela-
tions with the social environment. It consists of representations of
social interactions and relations, covering idealized engagements
with and disengagements from others throughout a life-time. The
self ’s phase space is therefore a space of the two fundamental vari-
ables of distinction and participation as introduced in the previous
section.
In order to deﬁne the phase space of an enactive self at the
most general level we abstract over all possible variations of dis-
tinction and participation (individually preferred ranges, different
cultures, at different times of life) and use distinction and par-
ticipation as variables D and P. This is in line with abstract
conceptualizations of psychological phenomena, such as Kurt
Lewin’s topological psychology (Lewin, 1936), in which personal-
ity and social relations aremodeled in termsof regions andbarriers
in ‘life space’ (Tschacher and Dauwalder, 1999). Our model of
phase space may also be associated with theoretical psychology
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(Leary, 1957), according to which personality involves an inter-
personal space that is similarly constituted by two dimensions,
agency and communion (Horowitz et al., 2006). In terms of psy-
chological development this resonates with the work of Mahler,
who described the infant’s self development as a process of indi-
viduation and separation through which the infant’s self emerges
subsequent to a post-natal period of symbiotic relation with the
mother (Mahler et al., 2000).
The variables D and P span the self ’s phase space, which can
thus be illustrated as a plane (Figure 1). We denote the states of
the self by their locations in this plane (D/P). The higher the value
of D, the higher the system’s distinction, and vice versa, the higher
the value of P, the higher is the system’s participation. Since the
enactive self is always relational, neither D nor P can ever have
a value of zero. In addition to its value of D and P, each point
(D/P) of the plane has a positive or negative “elevation,” so that
the corresponding slope represents repulsion from or attraction
toward this point. The self ’s behavior is represented by trajectories,
i.e., sequences of states in the phase space. Over time a self develops
particular tendencies to balance D and P (becoming more or less
distinct from others and more or less open to them). In terms of
DST we can say that the trajectories tend toward particular regions
of the phase space. When these tendencies become manifest, these
regions can eventually exhibit attractors we deﬁne in terms of a
particular value D/P. The attractor regions symbolize the location
of the individual’s developed and preferred zones of functioning
(balancing D and P). The phase space of each self has regions with
negative elevations (“wells” or “troughs” in the landscape of phase
space) that indicate attractors toward which the system will move.
Some regions are positively elevated and thus repulsive, which
indicates so-called repellors (the opposite of attractors). Attractors
and repellors emerge due to habitual tendencies and represent
goals of the self throughout a particular time span. Attractors of
distinction and participation must not mean that the individual
evaluates them as positive. Such tendencies and goals may emerge
due to the individual’s increased well-being in that region, but they
may also emerge due to system-external reasons (not controlled by
the individual) or habitual tendencies with a negative connotation.
Attractors may exist in different regions with different val-
ues D/P. They represent that an individual self has developed or
exhibits a certain degree of distinction in combination with a cer-
tain degree of participation. Consider a person who developed a
strong preference for high distinction and low participation for
particular life times. For example, a novelist who at some point
during the writing process escapes her social life, locks herself up
in a remote and quiet place in the mountains to ﬁnish her new
book. The novelist has experienced this kind of solitude as useful,
and so whenever she writes a book, she retreats to the cabin. In
terms of DST, during the book writing phases the novelist’s phase
space shows a particular attractor D/P with a higher value of D
and a lower value of P than usually. We may imagine the system
starting at some point in D/P landscape. The inclination of the
landscape at this point will then determine the direction of the
trajectory, which is generally away from repellors and toward the
deepest points of attractors. The system will change its distinction
and participation values until it has reached the point attractor
D/P (solitude and a minimum of engagement with others). The
system will remain in the attractor region unless the phase space
changes or until perturbations external to the system exert an
inﬂuence.
To describe how systems’ tendencies change through pertur-
bation, we can refer to another concept in DST, the gradients.
Gradients are often referred to as control parameters, but in the
context of dynamics of the self ’s organization this term, borrowed
from physics, is misleading. Gradients here are the environmental
ﬂuxes and affordances that drive, but do not control, a system’s
FIGURE 1 | An illustration of two generic individual phase spaces of
the enactive self. The individual self states are symbolized as red and
blue balls. Their respective phase spaces are spanned by the variables of
Distinction D and Participation P. The attractors are wells in D/P
landscape, into which the self systems move. The red and blue arrows
indicate the trajectories of these movements. The graphic on the left side
illustrates a self (red ball) with an attractor with a greater value of D and
a lower value of P. The graphic on the right side illustrates a self (blue
ball) with an attractor with a relatively high value of P and a lower value
of D.
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self-organization. At certain critical values of a gradient, a system
may enter a novel, emergent state of its dynamics, and hence its
phase space landscape may become completely modiﬁed. Because
of these changes new attractors may arise, so that the phase space
of the enactive self should be conceived of as a ﬂexible landscape.
In case of the enactive self, gradients can refer to the social environ-
ment. Imagine for example that during the writer’s exile a friend
in need reaches out asking for support in a difﬁcult matter. This
perturbates and might also change the novelist’s current states
in D/P landscape. In tension to her initially preferred region of
low P she reacts to the friend’s perturbation by turning toward a
region with higher P values, thus adapting the current range of
preference in D/P. Another example is attending some party or
other obligatory social gathering, when one would actually pre-
fer spending a quiet evening at home. Because the social event
requires higher values of P it can signify a strong perturbation to
the current disposition of D/lower P. The prospects of attending
the party can therefore cause tension and actual struggle while
being there.
Strong emotions and other motivational parameters may also
be gradients that affect the self. For example, when the book is ﬁn-
ished, the novelist’s attractor may shift back to a different region,
with a higher value of participation. Here the gradient is moti-
vational (the author realizes that the book is ﬁnished). Persistent
sadness may for instance change a person’s D/P landscape and
entail avoiding connection with others, shifting her states toward
lower P values. Gradients can thus perturbate and change the
values of the self ’s attractor.
A formerly active attractor may “close,” leaving behind a quasi-
attractor in the same location (Haken, 2006). An example of this is
the perception of bistable stimuli, such as Rubin’s vase-face ﬁgure
(Figure 2). When the ﬁrst perception is that of a white vase, i.e., the
perceiver rests in the attractor “vase,” this will eventually give way
to the new perception “black faces.” In terms of DST, the system
has altered its display of attractors and the landscape of phase space
has changed (Haken, 1992). By staying in one attractor (“vase”),
the attention gradient that created this attractor becomes depleted
(Tschacher and Haken, 2007), so that the system will explore other
regions of phase space to eventually settle in a different attractor
(“faces”).
To sum up, we conceptualized the enactive self in terms of DST
as an attractor landscape in a social phase space that is organized
by the two variables of distinction and participation. Individual
changes of distinction and participation are expressed in terms of
trajectories through this landscape, and strong behavioral tenden-
cies in terms of attractors D/P. The stability of such patterns of
the self are constantly maintained and calibrated by external and
system-inherent gradients, such that changes of gradients will gen-
erally change the self ’s whole landscape. In the following section
we explore two examples of dyadic interactions on the basis of
these considerations.
DYADIC RELATIONSHIP AS NEGOTIATION OF INDIVIDUAL
AND DYADIC ATTRACTOR REGIONS
In this section we use the conception of the individual self in terms
of a D/P attractor dynamics for understanding dyadic relation-
ships. We will introduce two everyday examples of relationship
FIGURE 2 | A bistable stimulus according to Rubin (1921).
struggle, one in which interaction leads to a breakup the other
in which interactions are sustained. We conceptualize the two
couples in terms of DST as a dyadic relation between two indi-
vidual phase spaces. That dyadic relationship can be described as a
new kind of dynamical autonomous system (Luhmann, 1992; De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). We conceive of it as a new dynamical
system with a phase space that corresponds to sustained interac-
tions between the individuals in the relationship, a joint phase
space.
For reasons of simplicity, we assume that the formation of the
couple’s joint phase space is a summation of the phase spaces of
the individuals: we thus add the elevation values of the individual
phase spaces in each point of D and P. This means that when both
participants previously had an attractor in the same region of their
individual phase spaces, their dyadic joint phase space will have an
even deeper attractor in this region.
We then assume that at each point in time the states of
the interaction dynamic, represented through particular loca-
tions in the dyad’s phase space, affect the partners, in that
they act as perturbations on their individual phase spaces D/P.
Such perturbations occur at all times during the relationship. It
will be a task for the future to elaborate more concrete struc-
tures, but we offer a ﬁrst idea of how a joint state could affect
an individual. Firstly, interactions can perturbate one or both
dimensions of the individual’s developed or preferred range
D/P, distinction and/or participation (they can act as gradi-
ents). Secondly, not every perturbation must lead to change
in a current state or developed attractor D/P. Thirdly, it will
depend on the frequency and the quality of particular interac-
tions or patterns of interactions whether and how each state
or attractor is affected. We can assume that for each dimen-
sion D or P there will be interaction qualities that currently
matter more or less. For example, interactions that are too
frequent and aggressive, or not frequent and gentle enough,
may perturbate stronger on the dimension of P (openness) in
some individuals, while interactions bringing forth a pattern of
belittlement and shame on the one hand, or praise and recog-
nition on the other, may be more relevant to the dimension
of D (distinction). Whether and how much of the quality of
www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 452 | 5
Kyselo andTschacher Enactivism, DST and dyadic relationships
any of such interactions perturbates D or P depends on the
individuals. In the following conceptualization of two case exam-
ples in terms of DST we chose to refrain from more precise
description and restrict the analysis to a fairly general level of
interrelating individual and joint action. It will provide a very
basic answer to our question: why do couples struggle and
what constitutes well-being in a relationship? Each example is
approached based on two basic questions: ﬁrstly, how the individ-
uals’ particular negotiation tendency, i.e., their respective range
of distinction and participation initially match, and secondly,
whether and to what extent the actual interaction allows the par-
ticipants to maintain or to negotiate their individual goals of
balancing D and P.
EXAMPLE 1
She, an artist, has been exploring her inner experiential world contin-
uously in recent years investing considerable time and effort in various
practices of mindfulness such as yoga and meditation. Although she is,
as a performing artist, used to present herself on stage, she is careful
about the exhibition of her private self outside of the roles on stage. She
is generally rather inhibited to engage in an intimate relationship. He,
a scientist, is used to communicate his personal projects in public and
has a strong communion motif privately, being eager to engage in an
intimate relationship. After the two met at a workshop and with him
taking the initiative, the two soon enter an intense romantic relation-
ship. The initialmonths of the relationship are full of frequentmeetings
in a highly participatory mode. Soon, after a few months however, she
begins to feel pressured and cornered by him. She experiences fears and
crises,mainly as attempts to emancipate herself from the risk of becom-
ing too dependent on him. “Isn’t it true that people should learn to love
themselves ﬁrst?” she asks. To accommodate her struggle the couple
decides to try a more detached and individualized style of relationship
allowing her to spend more time by herself. After a while however, he
begins to feel unhappy about the lack of frequency and intensity of
their meetings. In his view they do not see each other enough. The
next months of the relationship show a continuous oscillation between
attempts to accommodate her need for more time by herself and his
need for more time being together. While he experiences her effort for
emancipation as too high, she experiences his effort for being together
as too much. She insists that over-attachment to the other is not love.
He complains that she is pushing him away. They have repeated argu-
ments about the meaning and goals of a relationship, their attempts
at improving the relationship do not reach consensus resulting in con-
tinuous emotional dissonance for both of them. The couple eventually
splits up after about 1 year of being together.
Let us begin with the ﬁrst question, the individuals’ general
tendencies of interrelating D and P with regards to the prospective
romantic relationship before they enter the relationship. Based on
the above case we derive that she has a stronger tendency toward
distinction and toward a sense of self as being a separated individ-
ual, whereas his proﬁle shows tendencies in the opposite direction,
toward a more participatory mode of identity construction. We
can state that the individuals’ attractors dwell in different regions
of phase space: as an individual, and with regards to romantic
relationship, her attractor resides in a region with a greater value
of D and a lower value of P. His attractor is in a region with
low distinction and high participation, featuring a lower value
of D and a greater value of P. Whenever these two individuals
start from mid-range values of distinction and participation, the
joint trajectory heads in opposition to her or his previous trajec-
tory. This couple corresponds to the phase spaces of the example
that we have given in the previous section “Socially Enacted
Autonomy from a Dynamical Systems Theory Perspective”
(Figure 1).
Let us now consider what happens when the two individu-
als in the couple of example 1 enter a relationship. To this end
we thus create a joint phase space adding the individuals’ pre-
ferred attractors of D/P. The new dyadic phase space thus exhibits
two attractors that correspond to the former individual attractors
(Figure 3). Dividing the time of their relationship into tempo-
ral windows, we look at three states this coupled system goes
through: t1, initial months; t2, adjustment phase I; t3, adjustment
phase II.
At t1, corresponding to the closeness and intensity experienced
in the initial phase of their relationship, we see that the dyad’s
states tend to reside in a range close to high values of participation
and lower of distinction (Figure 3). This is in accordance with
his previous individual attractor that showed a greater value of
participation. It is in dissonance with her previous attractor that
had a higher value of distinction.
At t2 the dyad’s state resides in a new region within D/P
plane migrating to an attractor with higher distinction and lower
participation levels. At the individual level this means that the
dyad’s trajectory thus moves closer to her individual range of
preference and farther away from his. However, the system
does not remain in this region but moves back again to the
previous region of higher distinction and lower participation lev-
els, in accordance with her and in tension with his individual
preference.
Subsequently, during the adjustment phase II, the dyad’s states
keep oscillating between the two opposite attractors. Except
for t1 the trajectories of the dyad never persistently overlap
with the individually preferred ranges (Figure 4). One might
FIGURE 3 | Illustration of the joint phase space of the couple in
example 1.The dyadic phase space is a summation of the individual phase
spaces (his low D and high P and her high D and low P, see Figure 1). The
graphic illustrates the couple’s states during the initial months of the
relationship (t1). The green ball symbolizes that they move in a region with
higher values of participation.
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FIGURE 4 | 2D illustration of the joint phase space of the couple
described by example 1.The attractors are depicted in blue, the repellors
in red. Attractors are circled showing that there was no overlap of the
basins of the two attractors.
describe this behavior in terms of a bistable quasi-attractor
dynamics, as in the example of Figure 2. The dyad depletes
a current attractor and subsequently revives a former quasi-
attractor in the sense of Haken (2006), to then again deplete
it and revive the previous one. The couple’s transients between
the two attractors eventually result in a collapse of the system
at t3.
EXAMPLE 2
She, an artist, has been exploring her inner experiential world contin-
uously in recent years investing considerable time and effort in various
practices of mindfulness such as yoga and meditation. Although she
is, as a performing artist, used to present herself on stage, she is more
careful about the exhibition of her private self outside of the roles
on stage and more reluctant to engage in an intimate relationship.
He, a scientist, is used to communicate his personal projects in pub-
lic and also has a strong communion motif privately being eager to
engage in an intimate relationship. However, he also likes spending a
lot of time by himself. Since the beginning of their relationship the
couple experiences short-lasting but intensive crises. In these crises
she feels pressure and fears of being overwhelmed and losing con-
trol. She would like to be by herself but at the same time she does
not want to leave the interaction, afraid to lose the connection or to
hurt him. He usually is shocked at the expression of her discontent
and feels overwhelmed or afraid of failing to please her. At the same
time he also experiences a strong pull to stay in the situation with
her, either because he is afraid to hurt her or to lose her. Both are
convinced that an intimate relationship requires efforts on both sides
and so they try different strategies to deal with their crises. Occasion-
ally the couple decides to brieﬂy interrupt the interaction trying to
become aware of individual feelings without worrying what the other
does. At other times, overcoming feelings of panic and losing con-
trol, they are open and trusting toward the other and remain in the
interaction. Both experience these phases as difﬁcult and feel strong
emotional dissonance. But they also learn that momentary discon-
nection does not necessarily threaten their relationship and that what
initially seemed frustrating can actually lead to a better mutual under-
standing. The couple experiences this as nourishing and as deepening
their connection.
Let us begin with the ﬁrst question, the individuals’ gen-
eral tendencies of interrelating D and P with regards to the
prospective romantic relationship before they enter the relation-
ship. Based on the above case we derive that she has a strong
tendency toward distinction and toward a sense of self as being a
separated individual whereas his proﬁle shows tendencies in the
opposite direction, toward a more participatory mode of identity
construction. However he also shows relatively high tendencies
toward distinction. The individuals thus have different prefer-
ences in negotiation of distinction and participation, i.e., the
attractors of the individuals are in different, but not opposite
regions of phase space: she has a high D/low P attractor, and
a repellor at low D/high P. The repellor represents her inhibi-
tion for highly participatory states when the range of distinction
is low. His attractor is also at greater values of D together with
moderate to high P (Figure 5, please note that her attractor is
identical to the attractor of the “she” protagonist of example 1,
cf. Figure 1 left), whereas his attractor slightly differs in the two
narratives.
Let us now describe the situation once the individuals of exam-
ple 2 enter a relationship and the individual phase spaces are
merged into one joint phase space (Figure 6). Corresponding to
the couple’s several instances of crises, the dyad’s states in example 2
oscillate between the two attractor regions. The dyad’s behavior
thus shows similarity to that of example 1. However, the transients
between the“deepest”points of the attractors here are considerably
shorter than in the dyad of example 1. Even though the oscillations
occur between different levels of participation, the individuals
show an overlap in their previous attractors with a high value of
distinction. The couple in this example thus has a region in which
the individuals share individual preferences. In terms of DST this is
to say that the basins of the two individual attractor regions create
an intersection, i.e., a region of overlap (Figure 7). Such connec-
tions between point attractors are called“saddles”(Figure 6). If the
couple continues to sustain interactions leading to an overlap of
their attractors, a saddle could“deepen”and turn into anew, jointly
created attractor indicating the couple’s sustained interaction
tendencies.
Conceptualizing the two relationship examples in terms of
dyadic movements away and toward greater distinction or par-
ticipation that are either in accordance with or deviating from
the individually developed attractor, we offer a simple model of
co-negotiation of self maintenance in dyadic interaction. In the
following sectionwe compare the two couples anddiscusswhat the
observed state changes could mean for relationship sustainment
and individual well-being.
DISCUSSION
In example 1 we see that the dyad’s interaction did not lead to
a joint region or attractor that was in the same region as the
attractors of both individuals. The couple’s states continuously
oscillate between two divergent attractor regions. Each attempt to
approximate the participants’ respective attractor zone implied a
deviation from the developed zone of the other participant. Each
experienceddeviationwas followedby a strong inclination to avoid
the jointly enacted quality and to increase it toward the opposite
direction and back to an initial preferred range.
www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 452 | 7
Kyselo andTschacher Enactivism, DST and dyadic relationships
FIGURE 5 | Illustration of the phase spaces of the individuals in example
2 (left: “She”; right: “He”).The phase spaces are spanned by the
dimensions of Distinction D and Participation P. Individual system states are
symbolized as locations of red and blue balls. The attractors are wells in the
D/P landscape, into which the self systems (balls) tend to move. Arrows
indicate trajectories from two arbitrary starting points.
FIGURE 6 | Illustration of the dyadic phase space of example 2.
The dyadic phase space corresponds to the individual phase spaces from
Figure 5. The couple’s state (green ball) is located in the saddle, the region
connecting the individual attractor regions.
Comparing the couple’s states to the individual attractor region
we observe that a greater value of D for him is in tension
with his preferred zone of well-being that entails lower values
of D. Yet when the couple’s states show a greater value of P,
then this implies a tension for her. For both individuals the
quality of interaction therefore turns out to be in continuous ten-
sion with their individual preference for self maintenance (the
preferred balance between D/P). The tendencies of the indi-
viduals to respond to the tension by fully going back to their
own preferred zone of well-being leads to a breakdown of the
relationship.
Based on this simple model we hypothesize that individuals
whose initial ranges of preferences of distinction and participation
FIGURE 7 | 2D plane view on the dyadic phase space of example 2.
The two attractor regions are depicted in blue, the repellors in red. The
attractors are circled. Their intersection represents the saddle region in
which the dyad’s state (green ball) resides.
are highly opposed are less likely to engage in sustained interac-
tions when for both participants the quality of interaction is in
non-negotiable tension to their developed preferences.
In example 2 a joint region (the saddle) was created based
on a partial match of the two individual attractor regions and
shorter transients back to original individual attractors. As in
the previous example the experienced quality of the interaction
(more or less D or P) perturbates the individual participants’ pre-
ferred range and is in tension with their attractors. However, in
contrast to example 1, the individuals do not fully go back to
their initial range D/P. Instead they remain within the vicinity
of the other’s range of preference. In example 1 the individuals
are affected by the interaction and act in accordance with their
own individual goals. In example 2 the individuals are affected
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by the interaction (experienced perturbation to D/P), but they
also adapt their own preference in dependence on and through
the interaction. As a result, their interaction not only pertur-
bates the individuals’ preferred range but actually alters it. In
this example, a higher value of P implied staying within some
region of higher P despite a tension with individual preference for
low P or, when the interaction showed a higher level of D and
this was in tension with a developed low value of D, it implied
approaching a higher D than usual. In this way both partners
increased the tolerance toward the interaction to act as a gra-
dient on one’s own individually preferred range of D/P. This
activity allowed for the development of a new, shared zone of
preference.
Based on this simple model we hypothesize that individuals
who have attractors that show overlap (here, in the dimension
of distinction) are more likely able to negotiate tensions caused
by perturbations and to jointly adapt their individually developed
attractors so that they allow for sustained interactions.
From the dynamical systems conceptualization of the two rela-
tionships we derive two styles of negotiation of D/P. The ﬁrst style,
corresponding to couple 1, shows that both individuals avoid devi-
ations from their original range of preference. We call this style
passive-closed as the individuals enter the relationship and react to
the tension it creates but do not actively shape the interaction nor
adapt their own attractor.
The second style, corresponding to the couple from example
2, shows tolerance for perturbation and potential change for both
individuals. We call this style active-open as the individuals enter
the relationship and gradually adapt their movement. An experi-
enced tension is not reacted to independently from the ongoing
interaction. The active-open style appears to delegate some of the
tension caused by perturbation into the individuals’ joint nego-
tiation of D/P, creating new, shared spaces of balancing their
individually developed ranges of D/P.
One can speculate that in this way some interactions can cre-
ate corrective experiences (Castonguay and Hill, 2012) to form
new, previously unavailable, evaluation and negotiation strategies,
thus effectively changing the individuals’ previously developed
attractors.
We hypothesize that the active-open style is more likely to
ensure well-being in a relationship, i.e., not only that a relation-
ship is sustained but also that the quality of the interaction can
meet the needs of both individuals. That said, we do not suggest
that the accommodation of participants’ well-being must always
imply an ongoing or actual engagement. There are cases, like
example 1, where a couple is unable to negotiate the individu-
ally experienced tension in a way that still allows for sustaining
their relationship. But it is easy to conceive of couples who man-
age to stay together and are unhappy nevertheless, simply because
the negotiation of tension occurs at the expense of the needs of
one or both. Negotiation of well-being in a relationship is not
only ﬁnding continuity in interaction, it is also ﬁnding it under
speciﬁc conditions, namely by considering whether the interac-
tion quality is in tension or in accordance with the individuals’
needs, and their developed preferences for D and P. Compatibil-
ity or well-being therefore does not necessarily require individuals
to share high values of participation and remain constantly open
and ready to be affected by one another. As example 2 shows, it
may also involve a greater amount of separateness or even peri-
ods of disconnection. In the example both partners might need
to strongly feel valuable as a person also independently from
the other partner or simply wish to spend more time by them-
selves. This could make them compatible despite a difference
in participation preference. This couple can sustain a relation-
ship with actual interactions and some extent of connectivity
but also with spaces of disengagement or disconnection, allow-
ing individuals to experience themselves independently from each
other2.
We should emphasize again that our suggestions apply for
close relationships and not for every social interaction. There
is an abundance of potential and actual social interactions that
are not even remotely considered to be relevant for a person’s
self maintenance. Certain types of relationships however, such
as romantic relationships, friendships or family bonds, but also
some relations dictated merely by cultural agreement such as
between employer and employee, are usually considered as fun-
damentally important or closer than others. Based on our model
we can speculate that this is the case precisely because they are
considered as important sources for self maintenance and spaces
for engaging in the existentially needed joint negotiation of both
norms of distinction and participation. The more a relationship is
deemed to provide such a space the more relevant it will appear.
In this sense, being in a relationship is also always an individual
choice.
Our account suggests that struggle in a dyadic relationship is in
principle unavoidable. This is because any sustained interaction
implies that there are two individuals that each have their own
goals of social survival and that thus have developed perspectives
on how interactions can contribute to them. This leads to constant
perturbations that individuals can experience as tension and that
can manifest as struggle. Whether or not the couple can maintain
the relationship will depend on the individuals’ range of prefer-
ence and their capacities to tolerate deviations from that range, but
also on how the individuals adaptively evaluate and re-evaluate the
interaction.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we conjoined the enactive approach to self with
dynamical systems theory to shed light on some basic dynam-
ics underlying struggle and communion in dyadic relationships.
We proposed a model of relationship dynamics in terms of a
dyadic phase space emerging through the summation of individ-
uals’ phase spaces and assessed struggle or well-being in terms
of movements of dyadic states in tension or in harmony with
individual attractors. The model predicts that a relationship is
sustained when the couple develops a new joint attractor toward
which dyadic states tend to move. This is most likely when there
is (1) overlap in preferred ranges of distinction and participation
2As stated in the famous expression “opposites attract,” individuals can also have no
overlap at all and still experience each other as compatible because their different
attractors may complement one another. And vice versa, individuals might have
a great overlap, sharing high participation and low distinction and still struggle
because of a lack of feeling acknowledged as being more than a partner for another
person.
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in combination with a high estimation of the relationship’s poten-
tial to accommodate balancing individual ranges of distinction
and participation, as well as (2) an active-open style, in which
participants adapt their individual ranges according to their inter-
action. Because such a relationship has greater potential to meet
the needs of both participants to feel more or less connected, and
more or less recognized in their own right, it is more likely to lead
to well-being.
Presently, we must note some divergences and limitations in
conceptualizing an enactive approach to self in terms of DST. In
the enactive view, the self is generally co-determined in interaction,
and thus already entails perturbations through social interactions.
The dimensions of distinction and participation not only mirror
the individual’s trajectories but also entail that these trajecto-
ries depend on interactions with others. At later stages of the
individual’s development, not every interaction matters for self-
organization. And yet, at the same time, a self also has developed
particular tendencies (dispositions) that constrain to which extent
these trajectories are open to perturbations by others, allowing a
more ﬂexible evaluation of interactions. Future elaborations on
our model have to account for the fact that social interactions and
relations matter at different but inextricably linked levels, such
as development, dispositional as well as situational enactment
of the self. They require clariﬁcations of enactive or dialectical
conceptions of identity and the development of corresponding
mathematical concepts to arrive at closer approximations for the
model and what the model represents. Levins’work on the relation
of dialectical and systemic theory (Levins, 1998) and Van Geert’s
DST approach to cognitive development in children (Van Geert,
1998) could serve as inspirations to this end.
Our considerations are exploratory, but we believe they can
serve as a starting point to deepen our understanding of the
complex interrelation between individual and dyad. They might
further help to shed light on interrelations of important phenom-
ena and aspects associated with struggle in dyadic relationships,
such as vulnerability and shame, mutual recognition, intimacy,
co-dependency, and trauma.
Apart from its potential to assist theoretical integration our
proposal may be supported by further quantitative research, for
example, through repeated measurements of D and P preferences
of people in a relationship. Methods are available for the assess-
ment of communion and agency (the FAMOS: Grosse Holtforth
andGrawe,2000; the IIP:Horowitz et al., 1994),whichmaybeused
as an approximation of the enactive concepts proposed here. It
also promises applicability to various empirical ﬁelds, for example
psychotherapy, and a variety of existing methods of measurement
could be used or re-evaluated in light of it.
In this vein, a goal of therapy could be to raise individu-
als’ awareness that they have existential goals (distinction and
participation) that are continuously at play and that affect
their interactions. At the same time, they should be encour-
aged to recognize that this equally applies to the partner and
that their relationship is thus a jointly negotiated dynamic of
their own individual goals (Stern, 2004). In therapy a cou-
ple’s current relationship status could be assessed in terms of
individuals’ current D/P attractors, how the interactions tend
to perturbate them, and the strategies that the couple uses to
negotiate these perturbations. This could be complemented by
an assessment of individuals’ attractors developed before the
relationship D/P (e.g., through questionnaires), and by deter-
mining the general likelihood of overlap between their attrac-
tor regions. For this purpose it might be crucial to evaluate
the actual capacities of the individuals for tolerating pertur-
bations and allowing for adaptive change in their developed
attractors D/P, taking for instance into account factors such
as stress level, emotion regulation capacities, attachment styles,
past traumata and how they might constitute hindrances (repel-
lors).
Since psychotherapy is itself a dynamic social interaction, it
provides a setting in which participants can develop, through
active engagement of client/couple and therapist, novel strategies
to co-calibrate their self-organization, i.e., narrow the win-
dow of oscillation between the opposing attractors or secure
a shared zone of well-being. To this end, especially, sys-
temic or interactional approaches to psychotherapy such as
the “open-dialogue” approach (e.g., Seikkula and Olson, 2003;
Seikkula, 2008) could serve as useful resources. We propose
that evaluations and improvements can and should also account
for the fact that enactment of relational processes is bod-
ily mediated. Inspiration for reconsidering interventions and
assessments in terms of co-negotiation of self maintenance
might therefore also come from areas such as mindfulness
training, body psychotherapy and dance therapy (e.g., Kabat-
Zinn, 1994; Koch et al., 2007; Röhricht, 2009; Tschacher et al.,
2014).
Last but not least, from an ethical point of view our proposal
is also meant to encourage a greater tolerance for negativity and
struggle as necessary aspects of social life. The self individually is
a locus of tension and conﬂicting tendencies: one needs others,
and yet at the same time one also needs to feel capable and rec-
ognized independently of them. When two people come together
the potential for conﬂict is increased even more. The recognition
that we contribute to one another’s self maintenance, and that this
is not an easy endeavor, could be a way of afﬁrming the socially
existential basis of life as such. Like life, the self resists rigidity. Like
life, it is ever moving and not fully determined as long as it exists.
Because of this openness of self, relationship struggle must be a
necessary aspect of life.
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